Chiwenga neglects his greatest asset at his peril

It is striking how neglectful ZANU PF are of the military at a time when arguably the elite in the party are more dependent on them than ever before if they are to retain power.

Many in the military, while loyal to ZANU PF, were deeply uncomfortable with the role they played in the presidential re-election campaign of June 2008. And thereafter, Junior officers and soldiers in particular were understandably frustrated over their terms and conditions of service, particularly with regard to the provision of food, equipment, uniforms, and the poor condition of ZDF accommodation. Chiwenga was inclined to be dismissive, saying complaints of this nature were normal and should not be blown out of proportion.

His view seems to be that strong leadership is all that is required to ensure there is no dissent and that it is soldiers' expectations that needed to be kept under control.

Chiwenga has seemed only concerned to protect own position by promoting his favourites and clamping down on elements he does not trust. He is not concerned about addressing the underlying problems. Chiwenga seems to have no appreciation of the resentment that builds up in the lower ranks over the senior ranks' exploitation of their position, not least in the case of the diamonds in Marange, where soldiers have been able to observe the looting first-hand. Even by the senior ranks, he is held largely responsible for the very low morale in the armed forces and the overall decline in standards in all departments of the military is laid firmly at Chiwenga's door.

The mood in the military has become increasingly charged since the Pomona barracks affair in latter part of last year. The incident provoked widespread suspicion at the time that Chiwenga had stage-managed the theft and the subsequent arrests of over one hundred soldiers and officers on suspicion of involvement in the crime. Chiwenga had been arousing growing resentment across the army command by surrounding himself with a cabal of Zezuru officers, some of whom were believed to have assisted him with the theft from Pomona.

Chiwenga genuinely sees himself as a future political leader outside of the armed forces in Zimbabwe. At least until the party congress he was reportedly confident that Mugabe would secure him a senior political position before he left office. This confidence was largely rooted in the knowledge that Mugabe was indebted to him for surviving as president after the 2008 elections - and would be reliant on his services at the next elections. He is however reported to be disappointed that he has not already been given that senior political position. He may find he needs the support of the Armed Forces if his ever to secure his political ambitions - in which case he will have to look after their interests rather better than he has done to date.

Why has Chiwenga decided to go it alone?

Fear that unless he was in control of his own destiny his own future security could never be guaranteed. Initially he thought his destiny could safely remain tied to Mugabe - at least as long as the latter conceded no ground to the MDC. From the outset, Chiwenga was prepared to do anything and everything to ensure that MDC was not allowed to govern.



He was particularly opposed to any MDC role within the security sector and went out of his way to ensure that the National Security Bill, drafted in March 2009, did not allow the National Security Council any powers over the JOC. Indeed, the National Security Bill was designed to be impossible to implement. It was planned as a concession to Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai early on in the IG, giving him something to claim as a victory while keeping him away from the security forces.



But Chiwenga remained alarmed at the credit the MDC was getting for some of the reforms that came in in the first year of the IG. He was particularly concerned at the divisive effect that so-called MDC success was having on ZANU PF and increasing evidence of factionalism in the party.



This was all too evident at the ZANU PF Congress in December, when it was agreed behind closed doors that, in the event of 'chaos' in Zimbabwe, the army should take power. As a result, ever since the Congress, Chiwenga has been securing funding, training militia and consolidating the military's presence in government. Indeed, the army already has 'plain clothes' military personnel in every ministry, local government and in key positions controlling the rural areas.



Chiwenga and Mnangagwa had worked out a detailed gameplan against the possibility of Mugabe's early death. But Chiwenga had difficulty persuading his senior officers to side with Mnangagwa rather than Mujuru (to whom traditionally many of them felt much greater loyalty). Chiwenga therefore decided to stick with the gameplan but drop Mnangagwa from the starring role.



Chiwenga who had found it expedient to align himself with Mnangagwa rather than Mujuru, after Mugabe made the former defence Minister, the Party Congress convinced him that neither could be trusted to steer the country through without provoking violent confrontation between their factions. Only Chiwenga as CDF acting in concert with his closest allies in the security machinery, his former commander Paradzai Zimondi and Police Chief Chihuri, could secure continuity of power.

Chiwenga - paving the way to the leadership

Chiwenga had long ago secured his own personal fortune through the illicit plunder of the DRC and the expropriation of property in Zimbabwe. He also made millions through exchange rate manipulation as inflation soared after the mismanagement of the economy by Gideon Gono. And, since March 2008, Chiwenga had been able to consolidate his own personal power while appearing to be doing so exclusively in pursuit of the president's and the party's interests.



As with Mugabe himself, his main weapon was fear. As soon as the results of the March elections started coming in, Chiwenga and his two cronies, Chihuri and Zimondi, started persuading Mugabe that he could not risk accepting the result - the consequences for them all were too unpredictable and potentially devastating. The Security Chiefs would deliver a Mugabe victory in the second round whatever happened. Having won this argument with Mugabe, Chiwenga built a community of interest within ZANU PF around this, most importantly, with Emmerson Mnangagwa, who was later to be nominated Defence Minister by Mugabe.



The next step was to ensure that he delivered the necessary outcome with Operation Makavhoterapapi (For whom did you vote?). This was done in June by resorting to such levels of violence and intimidation that no other country could bring themselves to recognise the outcome. Mugabe's election might have been lost had it not been for the intervention of Thabo Mbeki who brokered the Global Political Agreement that ultimately led to the Inclusive Government that gave Mugabe back his legitimacy.



Meanwhile Chiwenga had been busy cultivating his relations with the Chinese. His first attempt to buy arms from the Chinese was prevented by an international outcry when they tried to offload arms for him in South Africa and Angola. Undeterred, Chiwenga engaged the Chinese in joint ventures in Marange. The vast diamond wealth here held the potential not just to pay for any arms shipments but to house an airstrip to enable the illicit import of arms and equally illicit export of diamonds. First however he had to secure control of the country's most significant source of revenue. In October 2008, Operation Hakudzokwi (You Won't Come Back) was launched by the army, police and intelligence officers was launched to take over the Marange field. The crackdown which began on October 27 with military helicopters indiscriminately firing automatic weapons to drive out the diggers, lasted three weeks and more than 200 perished.



Once secured, Chiwenga needed to ensure that the fields were only mined by bodies controlled by the JOC. Air Vice Marshal Robert Mhlanga was the man chosen to spearhead the new mining arrangement. Two companies with no previous experience of diamond mining, Mbada and Canadile, both based in South Africa, became the front for JOC's exploitation of the fields.



Throughout this period, Chiwenga was securing a firmer and firmer grip on the army ,ruthlessly stifling discontent in the ranks of the military. In December 2008, after soldiers sided with poor protesters to protest against the collapsing economy,16 soldiers were shot in cold blood by members of the presidential guard. Three others died during torture.



In October 2009, at least 12 more soldiers died after being tortured following the disappearance of arms and other military equipment from the Pomona barracks. A further 120 apparently survived horrific torturing.



This clampdown has been accompanied by preferential treatment for Chiwenga's cronies. The most significant recent appointment is that of Brigadier General Douglas Nyikayaramba to Mutare to run the 3 Infantry brigade and control the Chiadzwa diamond fields. Nyikayaramba played a crucial role in fixing the 2008 presidential run-off.



Chiwenga also needed to secure for himself a private supply of weapons and the means to get them into the country. Chiwenga has been an increasingly regular visitor to China in the last couple of years, especially since military control of the diamond fields gave him the opportunity to achieve this. According to reliable reports, Chinese in military fatigues helped in the construction of the military airstrip at Marange which has a one-mile-long runway capable of taking the biggest military transport planes. Some of these were reported to be armed. Shipping containers filled with weapons have been seen on the airstrip.



Slowly but surely Chiwenga has been putting all the pieces in place to ensure that no-one can contest his bid for the top job.

Chiwenga playing a double game with Mnangagwa

In recent years it has been expedient and professionally necessary for Chiwenga to be seen to support Mnangagwa, especially in supporting Mnanagwa's aspirations to take over the Presidency from Mugabe. However, he is deeply uneasy about tying his own political aspirations to a Karanga.



While content to hide in Mnangagwa's shadow in support for his presidential pretensions, I have it on good authority that he has been making plans to succeed Mugabe himself. It has not been difficult to build his own plans around the contingency planning for Mugabe's death which relies heavily on the military. Mnangagwa will only realise when his own plans are well advanced that Chiwenga has had a different agenda.



This is not merely a question of Chiwenga feeling more secure with the current Zezuru ascendancy - as a former supporter of the Mujuru camp, he feels that he will be better placed to unite the party behind him than Mnangagwa. Indeed he has come to believe that only he can save Zimbabwe from being torn apart by the factionalism within ZANU and the struggle between ZANU and the MDC.

Chiwenga plans to succeed Mugabe

Ever since Chiwenga saw President Mugabe teeter on the brink of accepting the election outcome in March 2008, he has desired to take the reins of power in Zimbabwe. Since that time, Chiwenga has been striving to twist the whole country around his little finger. Up to now, Chiwenga has succeeded in hiding his agenda behind the interests of the party, especially the JOC.



Now, Chiwenga is more than ever desparate to consolidate his power base - Mugabe is aging fast, factionalism is now tearing ZANU apart. But he has alienated a small number of people among the elite in the process, people who will not benefit from Chiwenga's scheming and who will alert Mugabe to Chiwenga's plot.



Chiwenga seems to have secured money to fund his war chest for the next elections when he plans to make a bid for the Presidency. Chiwenga believes he is the only one who can protect the gains of the struggle and his own interests when Mugabe's failing health finally forces him to step down.

Mugabe gets the Presidency, the Praesidium and the Politburo he wanted - now where's the policy?

The more things change, the more they remain the same. I had hoped that the party congress would give the party a new sense of purpose and direction. But it was not to be. A bit of shuffling of seats in the presidium in December followed by a similar shuffling in the politburo. Since then the inclusive government has had its first birthday, the President his eighty-sixth and what change have we seen? None, apart possibly from a deterioration in the prospects for any co-ordinated approach to resolving the country's problems. All parties are increasingly characterised by neglect of everyone's interest but their own. But, in the absence of any attempt to address the national or common interest, no-one's interests are served. The party, the IG and the president are all one year older and the main thing that strikes us about all three is that they are one step nearer death.



The only player able to affect the fortunes of all three is the President himself. He is perceived to have got his own way at the party congress. The shuffling of seats in the party were the ones that he chose. He has secured his position as leader for a further five years and has secured the team that he wanted, but what does he plan to do with it? Was all the manoeuvring simply to secure his own position for another five years? What about the legacy that looked so shiny a decade ago but has since become so tarnished? Will he allow it to get yet more tarnished or take active measures to restore it?



Sadly at present it looks like the former. The only discernible ZANU(PF) policy is to block progress on any front until Tsvangirai and the MDC get sanctions lifted. Mugabe and ZANU(PF) must know that this is not in the MDC's power, but they do not seem to care. They are simply patting themselves on the back for turning the tables on MDC-T, for convincing SADC and SA that this is the only route to progress and for paralysing the IG. All this achieves is the perpetuation of an unsustainable status quo.



So what lies ahead for the country? Deadlock and paralysis with little prospect of a way out. The party congress' promise of unity "in defence of our natural resources and people's economic empowerment" looks a long way off - a privileged few engage dubious external partners to help them pick over our natural resources, empowering only them. The people are left as bystanders while the party squanders the gains of the liberation struggle and with it the support of its followers - hardly the best way to prepare for an election that will inevitably have to come, even if not till next year. At least 2010 saw some improvement in the quality of life of the people. 2011 promises only stagnation.

Is Chiwenga really a potential future contender for the Presidency?

It is one of Mugabe's weaknesses that he has always preferred to keep closest to him lesser individuals who he can control. The reason he has always played Mujuru and Mnangagwa off against each other is that each presents a real threat threat to his position. Neither Chiwenga or Chihuri present any such threat - both were saved from ignominy by Mugabe and their future would be nothing without him. Both men were considerably junior to the now much less powerful Zimondi in 1979. Mugabe hand-picked them not for their strengths but their weaknesses.

Chiwenga's major weakness of course was his failure to make the grade at the end of his training course in Gweru in the early eighties. This was such a personal setback that he was driven to kill himself - the only problem was that he failed in that as well. The bullet intended for his heart passed straight through his chest and out his back without hitting the intended target.

Often people consider failed suicide attempts to be really cries for help. There is no suggestion that this was anything other than a genuine attempt but it served as the most effective cry for help Chiwenga could possibly have made. The then PM, Robert Mugabe, took pity on him and got the instructors involved to reverse their decision. He then got Chiwenga promoted to Brigadier in the first batch of post-independence commanders of the army's four brigades. Rarely, if ever, has anybody's rapid promotion through the ranks been so genuinely accidental.

Chihuri's rise owes as little to competence as Chiwenga's and was if anything even more unlikely. In the late seventies, Chihuri was under arrest - but not by the white regime in the then Rhodesia for his activity against the Smith regime, but in Mozambique for plotting against Robert Mugabe! Indeed he was only released at the insistence of the then Governor, Lord Soames.

Although most former guerillas were integrated into the national army, Chihuri had to settle for the police which he joined as a lowly patrol officer. He progressed rapidly through the ranks despite (or because of?) a growing reputation for corruption - indeed despite being the officer in charge of Nyanyadzi police station in Manicaland when the police funds there were misappropriated, he was transferred from there to Mutare on promotion to superintendent while the case was being investigated - by Mutare CID. His subsequent rise to Commissioner was accompanied by further scandal, particularly during his period as Deputy Commissioner, and it is thought that the hold Mugabe has on him as a result ensures his long-term and unswerving loyalty.

The current rumours about Chiwenga's aspirations for the Presidency in the event of Mugabe's death may owe something to the recent downturn in the political fortunes of Emmerson Mnangagwa. Chiwenga is not someone with a political power base of his own but he would feel very vulnerable if his current political patron lost power - for whatever reason. Because of their close co-operation on the JOC, Mnangagwa would have been best placed to provide political top cover for Chiwenga in the future. But Mnangagwa's dramatic loss of influence in recent weeks might conceivably have caused him to consider other options. Whatever he might be considering however, he could never be a serious contender for the top job and if he tried to use his current position to secure it, neither the party or the people would tolerate it.